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Abstract
In recent years, personality disorders – psychiatric constructs understood as enduring dysfunctions 
of personality – have come into ever-greater focus for British policymakers, mental health 
professionals and service-users. Disputes have focussed largely on highly controversial attempts 
by the UK Department of Health to introduce mental health law and policy (now enshrined 
within the 2007 Mental Health Act of England and Wales). At the same time, clinical framings of 
personality disorder have dramatically shifted: once regarded as untreatable conditions, severe 
personality disorders are today thought of by many clinicians to be responsive to psychiatric and 
psychological intervention. In this article, I chart this transformation by means of a diachronic 
analysis of debates and institutional shifts pertaining to both attempts to change the law, and 
understandings of personality disorder. In so doing, I show how mental health policy and practice 
have mutually constituted one another, such that the aims of clinicians and policymakers have 
come to be closely aligned. I argue that it is precisely through these reciprocally constitutive 
processes that the profound reconfiguration of personality disorder from being an obdurate to 
a plastic condition has occurred; this demonstrates the significance of interactions between law 
and the health professions in shaping not only the State’s management of pathology, but also 
perceptions of its very nature.
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In the UK, as well as many other nations, psychiatric disorders relating to antisocial and 
criminal behaviour are objects of public, political and medical concern. Particular inter-
est has been focused upon the constructs of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and 
psychopathic personality disorder (psychopathy).1 Meditations on disordered personali-
ties date back to at least the 19th century (Berrios, 1993), and the ethical and clinical 
basis of maintaining personality disorders as the concern of the mental health professions 
has long been debated (Eastman and Starling, 2006). In part, this is a consequence of the 
fact that conditions such as ASPD and psychopathy are framed as global personality 
dysfunctions, rather than as discrete disorders (such as schizophrenia or depression). 
Individuals regarded as personality disordered – especially those who have committed 
criminal offences – transgress a range of boundaries: between normality and pathology, 
victim and perpetrator, and mental patient and criminal. These transgressions engender 
important questions about how the State can and should manage persons living under the 
label of personality disorder, questions that continue to resist easy answers.
In the UK, the increasing prominence of personality disorders in general, and ASPD 
and psychopathy in particular, is both a consequence of the perceived costs to society 
resulting from the actions of personality disordered individuals, and a result of the draft-
ing of controversial mental health legislation (debates about which often focused on 
personality disorders (Pilgrim, 2007)). In 1999, the Government began to formulate 
plans for rewriting the 1983 Mental Health Act (MHA) of England and Wales.2 These 
plans captured the attention of health professionals, who were keenly aware of the poten-
tial for new policy to reshape practice. However, the possible effects of new governance 
(and the clinical discourses that revolved around it) on framings of pathology were less 
widely appreciated. As debates over the MHA unfolded, personality disorder came to be 
regarded in new ways. Traditionally, ASPD and psychopathy have been thought to be 
resistant to clinical intervention; this was the dominant framing of these conditions even 
into the late 1990s. Yet, as debates on the MHA played out, framings of personality dis-
orders came gradually, but profoundly, to position these disorders as plastic rather than 
obdurate constructs: in effect, they became treatable.
In this article, I historicize these discourses; in particular, I seek to demonstrate the 
reciprocal shaping of clinical and legal debates that reconfigured understandings of per-
sonality disorders such that many clinicians came to regard them as being amenable to 
treatment interventions. Methodologically, my research examines personality disorder 
(particularly, ASPD) through an analysis of its framing within mental health policy 
debates and clinical discourse. I analysed all issues of the British Journal of Psychiatry 
(BJP) from 1950 to 2012 for articles, editorials and correspondence on personality dis-
order and mental health law, as well as other key papers, such as those that were fre-
quently referenced in the BJP articles I analysed. I paid special attention to writings from 
the late 1990s onwards, which were often part of a wider conversation around proposals 
to introduce a new MHA. I also inspected policy documents from the Department of 
Health (DH), which pertained to the re-writing of the 1983 MHA and the instatement of 
new services for personality disorder, and I read a wide range of commentaries by law-
yers on the legal changes taking place. I consulted these materials in order to gain access 
to the views of the range of experts who had a stake in the legal and clinical innovations 
taking place in forensic mental health. I also took the opportunity to attend conferences 
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and seminars on personality disorder, and conducted interviews with psychologists, psy-
chiatrists and neuroscientists working in forensic mental health.
My analysis is inspired by the tradition of material-semiotic theory within STS, which 
foregrounds the relationships between discourse, practice and things in the production 
and stabilization of science and society (Haraway, 1991; Jasanoff, 2004; Latour, 1987; 
Pickering, 1995). Such scholarship refuses both (techno)scientific and social reduction-
ism, and instead emphasizes how knowledge, artefacts and social processes mutually 
constitute and legitimate one another. In my analysis, I was concerned with how the texts 
in my sample framed (AS)PD. By employing the ‘frame’ metaphor, I draw on Erving 
Goffman’s (1986) frame analysis, which concerns how experience is socially organized 
and meaning is ascribed to entities and events, as well as historian Charles Rosenberg’s 
(1992) argument that, while there is a material and normative quality to disease, the rec-
ognition and naming of diseases are social processes. Rosenberg’s scholarship is less 
‘programmatically charged’ (Rosenberg, 1992: xv) than other writings on the ‘social 
construction’ of health and disease, as he refuses to assume that medical institutions are 
necessarily oppressive. His historical project attempts to remain sensitive to the poly-
semy of disease across time and space; by doing so, Rosenberg seeks to analyse how 
particular frames come to be used, rather than appraising how well they fit their ‘object’. 
Following Goffman and Rosenberg, I am concerned with the framing of personality 
disorder, and not with the ontological status of the disorders, per se.
With these conceptual and methodological issues in mind, we turn now to the analysis 
itself, which I introduce with an account of the legal and clinical configurations from 
which debates about the new MHA emerged. I then summarize some of the policy devel-
opments through the late 1990s and early 2000s and discuss the associated perspectives 
of psychiatrists and psychologists. I follow this with an analysis of the clinical debates 
about personality disorder that were touched off by the proposed legislative changes, 
before describing how the policy machinery itself shifted gear in order to accommodate 
some of the concerns of mental health professionals. The rapprochement between politi-
cal/policy and clinical goals came to be most visible in four new ‘Dangerous and Severe 
Personality Disorder (DSPD) Units’, which sought to treat patients with personality dis-
order, while at the same time managing the risks they presented to the public. Finally, I 
analyse the culmination of these various debates: the new 2007 MHA, and the growing 
(though still not universal) belief within the UK mental health professional community 
that personality disorders are treatable.
By presenting my historical narrative in this way, I seek to demonstrate how debates 
around, first, mental health law and policy, and, second, clinical knowledge concerning 
a controversial diagnostic label, became (re)energized and shaped one another. Such an 
account underscores the great extent to which UK clinicians mobilized powerfully to 
contest and eventually influence the new MHA, eventually structuring the regimes 
within which they would have to practice. Accordingly, the making of new mental health 
law in England and Wales did not entail some kind of unidirectional ‘capture’ of clinical 
‘interests’. Rather, as this paper will show, a more complex series of reciprocal interac-
tions and mutually constitutive processes between clinical knowledge, law and policy 
occurred. While my focus is explicitly on the UK, and on personality disorder, the broad 
conceptual claim I make – that interactions between medicine and law reframe pathology 
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in important ways – should not be regarded as necessarily restricted to this particular 
case. Many other nations have debated the moral and clinical issues associated with psy-
chopathy and related conditions, and mental health law is frequently used and critiqued 
as a means of managing ‘dangerous’ and ‘risky’ individuals. Future comparative work 
may usefully reveal how different legal and clinical cultures (and the interactions between 
them) produce different understandings of pathology (cf. Jasanoff, 2005: 15).
The 1983 MHA and the ‘patients psychiatrists dislike’
In 1983, the first new MHA in more than 20 years was unveiled in England and Wales. 
This Act, refining and extending much of the content of a 1959 predecessor, was largely 
steered by the recommendations of an expert committee chaired by Lord Butler of 
Saffron Walden. These recommendations were widely perceived to be humane, liberal 
and progressive, and the Act they helped to constitute was favourably received.3 However, 
this is not to say that there was no contention associated with the new Act. The crimino-
logical valence that had long been attached to certain aspects of mental health law drew 
attention, particularly with regard to the administration of offenders who were consid-
ered to come within the remit of the Act. The new MHA continued a tradition of allowing 
courts to order the compulsory detention of offenders with ‘mental impairment’ or ‘psy-
chopathic disorder’. However, it also implemented new restrictions on involuntary hos-
pitalization of criminals (as well as non-offenders) diagnosed with psychopathy.
Specifically, the 1983 Act introduced what came to be known as the ‘treatability test’. 
This mandated that an offender could only be held in National Health Service (NHS) 
settings if treatment was available, which was ‘likely to alleviate or prevent a deteriora-
tion of his condition’. This ‘test’ ensured that a diagnosis of psychopathy was not by 
itself sufficient for involuntary hospital detention. Rather, in order to justify legal deten-
tion, the disorder had to be defined as treatable. The new treatability test came to direct 
the attentions of mental health professionals working under the Act to the ontology of 
psychopathy. In particular it enjoined the question: could psychopaths be treated?
In the UK, as well as in many other national contexts, the treatability of psychopathy 
had long been a matter of contention.4 A minority position, which maintained that ther-
apy was both possible and potentially efficacious, has always been a part of clinical 
discourse; yet the majority of psychiatrists and psychologists were pessimistic about 
whether psychopathy could be treated. Following the new Act, forensic psychiatrist 
Adrian T. Grounds succinctly expressed this pessimism:
The detention of offenders in the legal category ‘psychopathic disorder’ in special hospitals for 
treatment raises a number of critical issues. There are doubts about the nature of the disorder; 
what constitutes treatment; who is ‘treatable’; the effectiveness of treatment; and whether 
evidence of psychological change implies reduced risk of reoffending. (Grounds, 1987: 474)
The treatability test in the MHA invited reflection on these issues, as did the influen-
tial third edition of the US nosology, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III), published in 1980. DSM-III devoted a major section to personality 
disorders, and the significance accorded to them was not lost on British psychiatrists. 
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The new category of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) was particularly interesting 
to forensic practitioners, due to its apparent overlap with the older category of psychopa-
thy. Furthermore, it had a more specific definition than the opaque construct of psycho-
pathic disorder in the 1983 MHA. Consequently, British practitioners increasingly 
favoured ASPD over psychopathy for categorizing antisocial individuals.
Previously, psychiatrists had commonly believed that personality disordered individ-
uals were a nuisance, who were far from being proper subjects of the ‘clinical gaze’. 
Rather, mental health professionals felt that dealing with personality disorder was an 
impediment to the ‘real work’ of treating people with discrete mental illnesses.5 
Individuals living under the label of personality disorder were frequently excluded from 
health services and often were explicitly disliked by practitioners. This disdain was 
exemplified in an influential 1988 paper, ‘Personality disorder: The patients psychiatrists 
dislike’ (Lewis and Appleby, 1988). The authors reported results from a study that exam-
ined psychiatrists’ attitudes towards personality disorder, and noted that patients charac-
terized with these disorders were described as ‘manipulative, attention-seeking, 
annoying’ (Lewis and Appleby, 1988: 45).
Clinical pessimism was not universal, however: some psychiatrists conceptualized 
personality disorders as treatable conditions. An influential proponent of this view was 
Peter Tyrer, a frequent writer on personality disorder and, from 2003, editor of the BJP. 
In 1991, Tyrer and colleagues, uncomfortable with prejudices against personality disor-
der, argued that:
One of the important consequences of better classification and awareness of personality 
problems is the recognition that people with personality disorders suffer considerably and merit 
help, even if it cannot always be given in a reliable and effective form. In the past, many 
therapeutic disciplines have tended to regard personality disorders as not really part of 
psychiatry’s province and that they should therefore be separated from ‘real’ mental illness. 
This view is often implicit and rarely finds its way into print but is unfortunately common in 
practice. Views of treatment are now changing. Psychotherapy in particular, which has always 
maintained that personality disorders are part of its territory, has persevered in attempts to 
understand and modify the harmful attitudes that dominate the personal lives and relationships 
of people with personality disorders, and has helped to transfer this awareness to others. (Tyrer 
et al., 1991: 468)
Tyrer attempted, in one move, to de-stigmatize personality disorders and advocate 
their treatment, emphasizing both the subjective distress suffered by patients and the 
extent to which they could be ameliorated though psychotherapy. Nevertheless, treat-
ment could be ‘long, arduous and difficult to complete’ (p. 468). Others agreed.6
As inspiring as Tyrer’s comments might have been to some mental health profession-
als, many others were concerned about the evidence for such claims. In the 1990s, the 
concept of evidence-based medicine began to resonate powerfully throughout psychia-
try, and ‘hard data’ on treatments for personality disorder became more compelling than 
rhetoric. As a 1998 editorial asserted, ‘[t]here is a need for claims of therapeutic success 
within the field of personality disorder to be rigorously appraised’ (Cawthra and Gibb, 
1998: 8). Such comments echoed those made by psychologist Bridget Dolan and psy-
chiatrist Jeremy Coid in an influential 1993 review of treatments for personality 
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disorders commissioned by the DH and the Home Office. While Dolan and Coid (1993) 
expressed cautious optimism about treatability, they also emphasised the need for statis-
tically robust trials to provide firm evidence for the effects of such treatment. These 
longstanding but relatively subdued tensions regarding the treatability of personality dis-
order were brought into sharp relief at the close of the 20th century when proposals were 
put forward to revise the 1983 MHA.
The making of dangerous and severe personality 
disorder
In 1999, the DH and the Home Office began to develop the new mental health policy. 
Consequently, clinical attention shifted profoundly toward these government depart-
ments. On 15 February 1999, Home Secretary Jack Straw introduced a new phrase to 
British health professionals: Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD).7 The 
concept of DSPD was widely regarded as having been animated, in part, by the July 1996 
murder of Lin and Megan Russell by Michael Stone. A prior-offender diagnosed with a 
personality disorder, Stone had used a variety of services through the 1990s and was 
involuntarily admitted into De La Pole Hospital, Hull, in November 1994. He was sub-
sequently discharged in January 1995, following a decision that he was no longer eligible 
for compulsory detention under the MHA (South East Coast Strategic Health Authority, 
2006). Media constructions of a dangerous individual abandoned by mental health pro-
fessionals as a consequence of legal constraints sat alongside broader public fears about 
predatory paedophiles and serial killers, and policy-makers appeared pressed to respond 
to these concerns (Freestone, 2005; Manning, 2002; Prins, 2007; White, 2002). For 
Straw, it was clear that there was:
a group of dangerous and severely personality disordered individuals from whom the public at 
present are not properly protected, and who are restrained effectively neither by the criminal 
law, nor by the provisions of the Mental Health Act … . [T]he government proposes that there 
should be new legislative powers for the indeterminate, but reviewable detention of dangerously 
personality disordered individuals. … The individuals concerned must have the best possible 
chance of becoming safe, so as to be returned to the community, whenever that is possible. 
(Straw, 1999, quoted in Gunn, 2000: 336)
Emerging from Whitehall rather than the Royal College of Psychiatrists, DSPD was 
not a medical diagnosis; rather, it was a new administrative category for risky individu-
als. Specifically, it included psychopaths and others meeting criteria for ASPD who 
were also believed to present a clear and enduring danger to the public. The law has 
long sought to control ‘risky’ or ‘dangerous’ individuals (Bartlett, 2003), and not just in 
the UK. However, what is pertinent here is that the already rather broad mandate of the 
State for defining and managing dangerousness was considered too narrow by Straw; he 
felt that powers for indeterminate detention should be extended, regardless of whether 
the individual to be detained was currently before the courts. The DSPD proposals 
therefore represented a radical step by the Government to regulate the administration of 
mentally disordered offenders, and hence of the mental health professions.
 at Edinburgh University on February 20, 2013sss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
36 Social Studies of Science 43(1)
In July 1999, a consultation paper was released that advanced the possibility of a 
legislative change that would enable individuals categorized with DSPD to be subject to 
indeterminate confinement in a special unit within a prison or NHS hospital (Home 
Office and the Department of Health, 1999). As ethnographer Mark Freestone (2005: 
450) put it, the DSPD Units were intended to be ‘a “third way” between the prison ser-
vice and the special hospital and as such a unique environment’: a place to detain indi-
viduals who were considered to be threats to the public, while at the same time providing 
mental health care to reduce the risk they presented.
As an instrument of governance, the DSPD proposals were closely related to the 
Dutch Ter Beschikking Stelling (TBS) System (de Boer et al., 2008), an institutional 
arrangement for the management of mentally disordered offenders, which aimed to 
reduce their risk to society. The proposed DSPD Units also echoed earlier suggestions 
made in 1975 by the Butler Committee (McCallum, 2001), and bore a striking resem-
blance to a recommendation advanced in the so-called Fallon Report (Fallon et al., 1999). 
Released in January 1999, the Fallon Report detailed the results of an inquiry into drug 
use, pornography and possible paedophile activity in Ashworth Special Hospital. The 
report proposed the establishment of special units for individuals with severe personality 
disorder within prisons and NHS facilities – similar, therefore, to Straw’s DSPD Units, 
and perhaps an inspiration for them (Bartlett, 2003).
Straw’s plans were unveiled at a time when significant doubts remained about the 
treatability of personality disorder. With such doubts and the Stone case in mind, the 
DSPD Programme was an attempt to remedy the social and clinical problems surround-
ing individuals with severe personality disorders. However, the DSPD proposals were 
widely resented and resisted by clinicians, and a number of opinion-pieces in well-
regarded journals attempted to rally mental health practitioners against them.8 In particu-
lar, these practitioners raised serious concerns about the possibility that psychiatry would 
move further from a therapeutic regime, and toward one of public protection.
The strongly authoritarian aspects of the DSPD proposals thus ensured that they 
would be strongly contested by mental health practitioners, many of who were – follow-
ing decades of criticisms by ‘anti-psychiatrists’ and others – keenly aware of and anxious 
about their potential to be agents of social control. However, the DSPD Programme was 
not the only change to mental health policy and practice that the government sought to 
introduce: as the 20th century closed, plans were in place to create an entirely new MHA 
for England and Wales.
Changing the terrain of mental health
Toward the end of the 1990s, it was increasingly felt by the Government that the 1983 
MHA was in need of ‘updating’. Accordingly, in September 1998 they charged an expert 
committee (chaired by Genevra Richardson, Professor of Law at King’s College, 
London) to review the Act. The Richardson Committee’s proposals were considered 
humane and progressive, and were received favourably by clinicians (Department of 
Health, 1999). For instance, the Richardson Report proposed to further what was widely 
understood to be the ‘clear therapeutic ethos’ of the 1983 MHA by extending the condi-
tions of the treatability test (Glover-Thomas, 2006: 23; Grounds, 2001).
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Four months after the release of the Richardson Report, in November 1999, a govern-
ment Green Paper was published: ‘Reform of the Mental Health Act 1983: Proposals for 
consultation’ (Secretary of State for Health, 1999). Like the DSPD proposals, this detail-
ing of the Government’s effort to reform the 1983 MHA was roundly disliked by clini-
cians (Zigmond, 2001). This reaction was exacerbated by the fact that, unlike the 
Richardson Report, the emphasis in the Green Paper was on compulsion – compulsory 
treatment and compulsory detention.
Further resentment was engendered by the Green Paper’s rejection of many of the 
Richardson Committee proposals (Bartlett, 2003). For example, in marked contrast to 
the extension of the treatability test recommended by Richardson, the Green Paper advo-
cated the removal of that test altogether. Furthermore, under its terms, personality disor-
dered individuals could be detained involuntarily on the basis of risk, irrespective of 
whether the specific DSPD proposals came to fruition.9
One point of agreement between the Green Paper, the Richardson Report, the DSPD 
consultation paper and the Fallon Report was that psychopathy should be removed from 
the MHA and replaced with the more general category of personality disorder. This was 
a move deemed by many to be ‘long overdue’ (Laing, 2000: 223), given that, in practice, 
the legal definition of psychopathic disorder was applied to a range of sub-categories of 
personality disorder.
Nevertheless, the Green Paper was heavily criticized by clinicians, as well as by 
members of the Richardson Committee itself.10 As lawyer Nicola Glover-Thomas put it, 
in the Green Paper, ‘risk management has trumped therapeutic endeavour’ (Glover-
Thomas, 2006: 32). Though the 1983 MHA referred to the risk presented by a patient, the 
Green Paper placed this theme in the foreground (Laing, 2000). The emphasis on risk – 
and the controversy that attracted – characterized the debate on the rewriting of the 1983 
MHA over subsequent years.
The danger of dangerousness
Notwithstanding the negative reaction to the 1999 Green Paper, the Government contin-
ued with its plans to revise the 1983 MHA and implement the DSPD Programme. In 
2001, £126 million had been committed to DSPD service development, and the pro-
gramme was being piloted at specialized units at Rampton Hospital and Her Majesty’s 
Prison (HMP) Whitemoor.
Rather than becoming the authoritarian and illiberal initiative initially feared by clini-
cians, once it was implemented, the DSPD Programme represented a ‘watered down’ 
version of the original proposals and worked within the ambit of existing legislation. The 
Units were extremely well resourced, with little expense spared in terms of both their 
construction and function.11 High costs were justified in the context of the government’s 
longer-term plans for mental health and crime control.
DSPD also formed the explicit focus of a 2000 mental health White Paper (Department 
of Health, 2000a,b). Underscoring the Government’s concerns with personality disorder 
and dangerousness, the White Paper was very poorly received. One BJP editorial argued 
it to be a ‘profoundly illiberal document’ (Grounds, 2001: 387), noting its inclusion of 
potentially broader criteria under which mentally disordered offenders could be 
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indeterminately detained. Similarly, a British Medical Journal editorial (Szmukler, 
2001) expressed the continuing concerns of clinicians with the Government’s proposals, 
and highlighted the difficult balance between care provision and risk control.12
Critical voices emanated from across the UK, including professionals at the ‘coal 
face’ of practice – mental health lawyers, as well as clinicians (Peay, 2003). Critics 
focused on the preoccupation with risk and ‘dangerousness’ that characterized the White 
Paper (Buchanan and Leese, 2001); further, they raised questions about the meaning of 
dangerousness: How would it be measured? How dangerous would an individual have to 
be to qualify for the DSPD programme? How did dangerousness relate to treatability and 
to risk? In 2002, a Draft Mental Health Bill was published, but these key questions 
remained largely unanswered.
Surprisingly, given the Government’s previous focus on DSPD, the 2002 Draft Bill 
did not specifically address this category. However, mental health stakeholders found the 
Bill troubling for a variety of reasons, not least because its wording raised concern that 
highly antisocial individuals (i.e. individuals who might come under the rubric of DSPD) 
could nevertheless more easily be detained involuntarily within mental health services. 
Significant debate reigned over this point (Pilgrim, 2007). Yet, as lawyer Peter Bartlett 
pointed out, the concept of dangerousness was nothing new to English and Welsh mental 
health legislation (or, indeed, to that of other nations), and contemporary concerns about 
social control ignored the uncomfortable fact that psychiatry had always played a promi-
nent role in the governance of deviance. Furthermore, it was ‘not obvious’ how far the 
new Bill extended existing powers for the detention of individuals who were perceived 
to be a threat to others (Bartlett, 2003: 328). In spite of these caveats to the profusion of 
clinical concerns, Bartlett nevertheless considered the Bill ‘badly flawed’ (p. 327) and 
observed that with it, ‘the government managed to achieve a consensus rarely seen in 
mental health politics. Sadly, the consensus was negative: virtually no one supported the 
draft bill’ (p. 326).13
Towards treatability
As debate about the MHA reigned, deliberations regarding the treatability of personality 
disorder became increasingly apparent. Promissory discourse about the potential to treat 
personality disorder in more efficient and efficacious ways was instantiated within new 
academic units, such as the Nottingham Personality Disorder Institute, and informal net-
works and formal associations, such as the British and Irish Group for the Study of 
Personality Disorder (BIGSPD; formed in 2000). These centres and fora arose from and 
further animated clinical interest in the aetiology, development and treatment of person-
ality disorder.
At the same time, public spending on personality disorder services and research from 
bodies such as the MRC, the DH and the DSPD Programme significantly increased. 
Established in April 1999 (3 months before the release of the initial joint Home Office/
DH proposals for DSPD), the National Forensic Mental Health R&D Programme com-
missioned research on behalf of the DH; in doing so, it became a key funder of scientific 
and clinical research into personality disorder. The Programme also commissioned lit-
erature reviews into the aetiology of personality disorder and its management. Of course 
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the proliferation of research and the promise of new treatments for personality disorder 
did not readily foster a unified front of clinical optimism; views remained mixed.14 Yet, 
while some clinicians were pessimistic, a growing number of others wrote articles and 
gave commentaries that pointed towards effective interventions. The London-based 
‘therapeutic communities’ at Cassel and Henderson Hospitals were highly regarded for 
their effective work with individuals with personality disorder (Manning, 2002), and 
psychotherapeutic strategies more broadly were viewed with optimism, partly as a con-
sequence of a new, growing evidence base.15
In particular, faith in psychological techniques such as cognitive analytic therapy 
(CAT) and dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT, an approach based on cognitive behaviour 
therapy (CBT)) was increasing during the first few years of the 21st century, even as the 
number of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) remained low. Pharmaceuticals, such as 
antipsychotics and antidepressants, were also being used as ‘adjuncts’ to the more conven-
tional psychotherapeutic management strategies for personality disorders, which brought 
into sharp relief the ontological plurality so often evident within psychiatry (Helén, 2011; 
Pickersgill, 2010).16
Optimism was exemplified in bold claims about treatability. For influential 
Broadmoor-based psychotherapist Gwen Adshead, there could be ‘no justification for 
global assertions that personality disorder is untreatable’ (Adshead, 2001: 412). Treatment 
strategies also became increasingly nuanced. Clinicians were urged to forego the notion 
of a ‘fix all’ for personality disorder, and to concentrate instead on the ‘functional assess-
ment’ of the condition (Davidson, 2002). The functional approach produced an increas-
ingly modularized view of personality; first, by cataloguing an individual patient’s 
specific ‘abnormal’ personality features and exploring the distress the patient experi-
enced as a result of them, and, second, by using the catalogued features as the basis for a 
complex management plan. Such a plan would be ‘bespoke’, rather than ‘off the peg’; 
individualized, but nevertheless drawing on an eclectic array of standard interventions.17 
By the end of the 20th century, then, a number of key actors were beginning to treat per-
sonality (disorder) as potentially plastic – capable of responding to the appropriate and 
skilled application of psychiatric and psychological knowledge.
However, despite the enthusiasm that many health professionals expressed toward the 
idea that personality disorder could be effectively treated, not everyone was so positive. 
For example, Rampton Hospital psychologist Kevin Howells and his colleagues sug-
gested that different models of personality disorder lay beneath the assorted treatment 
strategies, raising questions about appropriateness and efficacy (Howells et al., 2007). 
There also were concerns that many of the treatments touted for a broad spectrum of 
personality disorder had shown evidence of effects only for borderline personality disor-
der (Crawford, 2007) – like ASPD, this was one specific ‘variant’ of personality disorder. 
Furthermore, as Peter Bartlett wryly observed, the ‘predicted treatability of a given psy-
chopath seems to a significant degree dependent on the psychiatrist engaged in diagno-
sis’ (Bartlett, 2003: 328). Thus, while the mental health professions undoubtedly were 
moving toward an understanding of personality disorder as treatable, there was by no 
means a consensus on the issue. Yet it was precisely because the tide of opinion on per-
sonality disorder was so clearly turning that some commentators felt compelled to 
advance such caveats.
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A policy push
While some clinicians at the coalface of practice wrote positively, yet cautiously, about 
the treatability of personality disorder, there was markedly less subtlety in some of the 
proclamations made by the DH. In an attempt to correct what was still the common atti-
tude that individuals with personality disorder should not be the concern of mental health 
services, the newly formed National Institute for Mental Health in England (NIMHE) 
published a report (National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003a) that argued 
that these conditions were treatable; any remaining doubt about this was regarded as 
lamentable, and something that a new MHA might redress. Indeed, it was explicitly 
stated that the controversial removal of the 1983 treatability test would ‘highlight the 
need for new community and in-patient services for people with personality disorder’ 
(National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003a: 28). Clinicians were encour-
aged to be more open-minded to the potential of treatment in light of this.
Ten months later, the NIMHE released the ‘Personality disorder capabilities frame-
work’. This was part of a document provocatively titled ‘Breaking the cycle of rejection’ 
(National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003b), and aimed ‘to challenge the 
discriminatory association between personality disorder and dangerousness by putting in 
place services aimed at reducing vulnerability and promoting more effective coping by 
individuals’ (National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003b: 10). The document 
further promoted a vision of treatability by painting a more sympathetic picture of per-
sonality disorder than many others (including the DH) had in the past:
In recent years, the emphasis on risk and dangerousness associated with a very small number 
of people with personality disorder, has obscured the fact that very many people with this 
diagnosis are highly vulnerable to abuse and violence themselves – and to self-harm and 
suicide. (National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003b: 10)
Perhaps unsurprisingly, although the NIMHE document alluded to the MHA in its 
section on ‘The broader policy context’, it refrained from more explicit articulation of 
the interconnections between the assumed clinical antipathy towards personality disor-
der and the proposed MHA (specifically, the provision that would remove the treatability 
test). The controversial category of DSPD – which was at the forefront of many clini-
cians’ attention at the time – was not even mentioned. The influence of both DSPD and 
the 2002 Draft Mental Health Bill was nevertheless evident in the list of competencies 
deemed necessary for clinicians working with individuals diagnosed with personality 
disorder: in particular, skills in ‘assessing and managing risk to self and others’. Risk, the 
leitmotif of the proposed reforms to the 1983 MHA, thus structured the NIMHE clinical 
guidelines, even as the same document made gestures to de-stigmatize the disorder.
The assumed importance of a consensus that personality disorder was treatable to the 
acceptance of the removal of the treatability test was also instantiated through a 2003 
treatment review (Warren et al., 2003). The review, which was commissioned by the 
Home Office and DH through the DSPD Programme, aimed to provide an evidence base 
for ‘informing the decisions about the development of services for DSPD’ (Warren et al., 
2003: 8). Building on the aforementioned review by Dolan and Coid (1993) (Bridget 
Dolan was one of the authors of the 2003 report), the 2003 ‘update’ came to similar 
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conclusions: namely, that personality disorder was (potentially) treatable, especially 
through the application of therapies such as DBT and therapeutic community models. 
There was markedly less evidence for pharmacological management strategies, not least 
because of the allegedly poor methodological design of published studies – a limitation 
perceived to be characteristic of much of the existing research.
Unfortunately, Warren and colleagues could find no RCTs – the biomedical ‘gold 
standard’ – within the most secure NHS facilities. This deficiency was lamented by 
Warren et al., although they nevertheless argued that their findings were substantiated by 
including less ‘reliable’ studies in their review (Warren et al., 2003: 5). By doing so, they 
could make the mass of evidence supporting the claim that personality disorder was 
treatable seem weightier than if they had employed rigorous statistical inclusion criteria. 
In short, the review contained a message that both policymakers and many clinicians 
were receptive to: personality disorder was treatable, but more research was needed.
In sum, through 2002 and 2003, the development of policy and clinical discourse on 
personality disorder brought the treatability of these conditions sharply into focus. In 
recognition of the controversy it had generated and mindful of its aims to successfully 
implement DSPD policy, the DH sought to ally itself with mental health professionals. It 
did this, first, by evoking tropes similar to those that had become increasingly evident 
within clinical discourse – chiefly, those tropes that tended to de-stigmatize personality 
disorder and to emphasize its treatability. Second, it articulated these tropes within the 
pages of key documents, which aimed, in part, to foster a more favourable outlook 
towards the proposed new mental health legislation. In the process, the hopes of clini-
cians were brought more closely into alignment with the aims of policymakers.
How to treat dangerousness
The alignment of policy and clinical goals was most markedly apparent in the new DSPD 
Units. By autumn 2005, four high security pilot DSPD Units were running, which con-
tained ‘some of the most difficult and challenging individuals in society’ (DSPD 
Programme, 2005: 27). Two Units were inside prisons (HMP Frankland and HMP 
Whitemoor), and two were within NHS hospitals (Broadmoor and Rampton). Generally 
speaking, the prison Units stressed the correctional aspects of the DSPD Programme, 
whereas the hospitals focussed more on the therapeutic components. However, even 
within DSPD Units, there were tensions between carceral and clinical approaches 
(Freestone, 2005; Maltman et al., 2008)
Treatment itself, at least in Broadmoor and Rampton Hospitals, was administered 
by multidisciplinary teams consisting of clinical and forensic psychologists, psychia-
trists and mental health nurses, working together with occupational therapists and 
other health and social care professionals. These individuals acted simultaneously to 
implement the DSPD policy and to treat the psychological and social deviancy of 
patients diagnosed with personality disorder. Treatment aimed to reduce offending 
behaviour, though many clinicians were concerned to treat ‘the person in personality 
disorder’, rather than managing only those aspects that were (in the modularized 
vision of personality) assumed to be associated with (if not determinative of) offend-
ing behaviour.
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While medication was occasionally used as an adjunct, psychological therapies 
were the principal tools used by mental health professionals in the DSPD Units.18 In 
particular, CBT (of the sort used in the probation service) and related techniques pre-
dominated.19 As Armstrong (2002) has shown, CBT is well positioned to serve both 
punitive/criminological and therapeutic/clinical ends: it is retributive (individuals are 
held accountable for their antisocial behaviour) while also being rehabilitative (antiso-
cial behaviour decreases following therapy). Accordingly, it is not surprising that CBT 
migrated from probation services to the criminological–medical hybrid that is the 
DSPD Programme.
The role and nature of treatment in DSPD Units draws our attention to three central 
issues. First, DSPD Units are sites where the goals of policymakers and clinicians are 
closely aligned: policymakers can be satisfied that the risk that dangerous offenders rep-
resent is being reduced, while psychiatrists and psychologists are given the time and 
resources to obey a clinical imperative to treat individuals diagnosed with personality 
disorder. Second, the autonomy of clinicians within DSPD Units complicates the pre-
sumption of the unilateral political capture of clinical goals that might be inferred from 
the previous section. That some health professionals practising within the DSPD 
Programme frame their work as treating personality disorder rather than solely managing 
the risky behaviours associated with it reveals a more dynamic, though still asymmetric, 
relationship between the aspirations of the DH and clinical communities. Third, the 
activities of the DSPD Units have subtle but potentially profound implications for 
the understanding of personality disorder. With few established conventions regarding 
the ‘correct’ way to treat these conditions but with a remit to do so regardless, profession-
als in the DSPD Units experimented with different forms of psychotherapy and medica-
tion. The various treatments relied on diverse underlying models of personality disorder; 
by juxtaposing these therapies, heterogeneous models of the conditions were assembled 
and reconstructed. The DSPD Units therefore acted as laboratories within which fram-
ings of personality disorder could be experimented with, and they played a salient role in 
the constitution of the conception that personality disorder was treatable.
The social shaping of mental health law
Though clinicians were busy experimenting with personality in the DSPD Units, they 
nevertheless found time to continue contesting the Government’s ever-evolving plans 
for mental health law. As we have seen, the 2002 Draft Mental Health Bill did not 
garner the support the DH had hoped. It was thus withdrawn and, in September 2004, 
a new Bill was released (Department of Health, 2004a). Somewhat less controversial 
than its predecessor, the Bill marginally mollified detractors by reintroducing some 
treatability criteria for cases where involuntary compulsion was being considered. 
Despite this move, it was still criticized for its emphasis on risk. Furthermore, some 
of its detractors claimed that the Bill ignored, for the most part, the views of important 
mental health institutions such as the Royal College of Psychiatrists. This was inter-
preted as exemplifying the Government’s indifference both to the clinicians who 
would implement the new MHA and the patients who would be under its purview 
(Brown, 2006).
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The Government, however, considered that it had ‘taken seriously the concerns 
raised about the first version of the draft Bill’ (Department of Health, 2004b: 4), but 
it did not push forward the second Bill. Seemingly in response to the massive criti-
cism levelled against it over the previous seven years, the DH instead made a differ-
ent move; specifically, it announced in March 2006 that, rather than completely 
rewriting the 1983 MHA, it would instead amend it (Brown, 2006). Accordingly, on 
18 November 2006 a (third) new Mental Health Bill was released (Department of 
Health, 2006a).
The 2006 Bill was, of course, criticized. Like its predecessors, it forsook the treat-
ability test; according to the DH, this was because the test had led ‘to a false presumption 
that some – particularly those with severe personality disorders – are untreatable. This 
means that detention is sometimes not used when it ought to be, even though people with 
severe personality disorders can be – and are – treated compulsorily under the Act’ 
(Department of Health, 2006b: 3). By removing the treatability test, the legislation aris-
ing from the 2006 Bill would ‘take away some unnecessary obstacles to practitioners’ 
ability to use the Act where it is warranted by the needs of the patient and the degree of 
risk’ (Department of Health, 2006b: 3).
Yet, the treatability test was not altogether abandoned. In its place stood the new 
‘appropriate treatment test’. Similar to the 1983 treatability test, this revised set of 
criteria for detention included the key qualification that treatment should be readily 
‘available’ for patients, rather than merely being a theoretical possibility. Apparently, 
the appropriate treatment test would call for ‘an holistic assessment of whether 
appropriate treatment is available’ (p. 2); this was seen as a means of shifting clinical 
attention away from treatment outcomes alone – a perceived flaw of the 1983 treat-
ability test.
Nevertheless, what, precisely, a ‘holistic assessment’ entailed was unclear, so too 
was the procedure for establishing (or formally contesting) whether a particular 
treatment was ‘appropriate’. Furthermore, many commentators were concerned that 
the Bill illegitimately conflated ‘appropriate’ with ‘effective’ treatment. In other 
words, they were concerned that individuals could be detained as a consequence of 
some kind of treatment being available, irrespective of whether it was the right kind. 
By removing the treatability test and replacing it with the appropriate treatment test, 
the DH sought to ensure that people who ‘had’ to be involuntarily detained could be 
held, but with appropriate safeguards in place: at least some kind of treatment needed 
to be available for the individual being detained. Accordingly, it was argued that 
the new legislation would not result in ‘any significant increase in people detained’ 
(p. 3).
In spite of the concerns outlined above, eventually the Bill was passed with some 
modifications. Thus, after almost a decade of political wrangling, a new MHA for 
England and Wales was given Royal Assent on 19 July 2007. In marked contrast to the 
original plan for a radical reconstruction of the 1983 Act, the new MHA was an amended 
version of its predecessor. The chief detractors of the DH were, for the most part, molli-
fied (Mental Health Alliance, 2007); not surprisingly, though, some disapproval still was 
registered (Prins, 2007).
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Personality disorder is treatable (isn’t it?)
On 22 June 2007, one month before the 2007 MHA received Royal Assent, the National 
Forensic Mental Health R&D Programme officially closed. The DH, it seems, no longer 
felt the need to continue to invest so significantly in research concerning the treatability 
of personality disorder, since effective treatments were now widely considered avail-
able.20 As Frankie Pidd, of the DH National Personality Disorders Development 
Programme, commented in an article co-authored with psychologist Janet Feigenbaum:
The evidence base has emerged over the past two decades to indicate that personality disorders 
are treatable. A range of psychological therapies has been shown to be the most effective 
treatment for personality disorders, though medication can have some additional effect in 
reducing the severity of symptoms. (Pidd and Feigenbaum, 2007: 8)
Though Pidd and Feigenbaum accepted that some clinicians might disagree, they 
asserted that such disagreement was based on a ‘false belief’ (Pidd and Feigenbaum, 
2007: 7), and, worse, a belief that would increase the stigmatization of individuals diag-
nosed with personality disorder. Pidd and Feigenbaum therefore evoked a narrative of 
de-stigmatization, consistent with the trend in the mental health professions since at least 
the 1990s (Pilgrim and Rogers, 2005), which was especially apparent in recent years in 
the discourse concerned with personality disorder. In so doing, Pidd and Feigenbaum 
presented not only a therapeutic imperative to work with individuals with personality 
disorder, but an ethical duty as well.
Further, journals such as Psychology, Crime and Law devoted entire issues to contri-
butions on personality disorder, many of which newly emphasized the treatability of 
these conditions. As widely regarded clinical psychologist Peter Fonagy noted in one 
special issue’s introduction, clinicians should ‘celebrate the emergence of effective bio-
logical and psychosocial treatments’ (Fonagy, 2007: 3). For personality disorder expert 
John Livesley, the literature was now ‘clear that personality disorder can be treated’ 
(Livesley, 2007: 28).21
It can be seen, then, that claims in recent years to the effect that personality dis-
order is treatable have come to resound powerfully through clinical discourse: 
reported inside journal pages, argued through presentations in large conferences and 
small seminars, and attested to by practising psychologists and psychiatrists. Today, 
individuals with disordered personalities are still considered problematic, ‘one of the 
most difficult groups in psychiatric practice’ (Newton-Howes et al., 2006: 18). But 
many professionals now at least consider that treatment is possible, despite the con-
tinued scepticism.
Conclusion
This article has shown how personality disorders came to be widely regarded as treatable 
in the clinical professions and the policy arena. In particular, I have highlighted the 
important role of mental health policy debates in helping to effect this shift. In significant 
ways, attempts to rewrite the 1983 Mental Health Act of England and Wales directed new 
attention to longstanding problems with personality disorder: How should offenders with 
 at Edinburgh University on February 20, 2013sss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Pickersgill 45
this diagnosis be managed? Who should take responsibility? Are conditions like ASPD 
and psychopathy even treatable? While law is a powerful tool for ordering a society, 
debates over legislative changes cast into sharp relief the ambiguities law is designed to 
manage. By proposing to rewrite the MHA – in particular, by issuing forth highly contro-
versial and contested proposals – the DH animated clinical discourse on personality dis-
order, creating new fora for clinicians to articulate their views on the treatability of these 
conditions. Such debate was also directly fostered by the DH; for instance, when it com-
missioned reviews on and research into treatments. In time, a new convention began to 
emerge: personality disorder was framed by many clinicians as treatable, and personality 
itself was regarded as plastic; an entity mouldable through the skilful application of clini-
cal technique. Therapeutic technologies did not so much involve the use of novel phar-
maceuticals; instead, they made use of more familiar psychological methods.
Visions of treatability were instantiated within the new DSPD Units, which them-
selves straddled the boundaries between the mental health and criminal justice systems. 
The Units, which were set up by the State as part of plans to reform the management of 
mentally disordered offenders, achieved legitimacy through the emerging consensus 
among clinicians that personality disorders such as ASPD and psychopathy were now 
treatable. The very existence of the Units arguably helped to legitimate this novel accord, 
and, in turn, to justify the vast public expenditure on the contested and controversial 
category of the population held in those Units. Political intentions to remove the treat-
ability test from the 1983 MHA seemed more palatable after individuals with personality 
disorder were widely understood to be patients who could – and should – benefit from 
clinical intervention; the dismay expressed by many mental health professionals about 
changes to the MHA were damped down. The ‘danger’ of DSPD was, to an extent, 
neutralized.
While the DH profited from the new understanding of personality as a treatable entity, 
so too did clinicians who had long held that belief. The material and symbolic benefits 
for these psychologists and psychiatrists included acceptance by their peers, as well as 
increased funding, jobs, and support for treating patients with personality disorder, par-
ticularly through the DSPD Programme (Manning, 2002). Clinicians used the resources 
of DSPD Units to treat their patients, while at the same time they critiqued the notion that 
DSPD was a legitimate medical category. In this way clinicians, in part, appropriated and 
subverted the very policy aimed at their regulation.22
More generally, we have seen how UK clinicians mobilized broadly and powerfully 
to contest and eventually influence the new MHA, and that they succeeded in shaping, if 
not determining, a law that would, in time, govern their practice. The recent history of 
British mental health is not, therefore, a simple story of the linear ‘capture’ of clinical 
goals by policymakers. Rather, it is a more complex narrative about the mutual constitu-
tion of policy and practice, of legal structures and clinical knowledge, and of the multiple 
acceptances and resistances that have enabled this.
The DSPD Units became important sites for treatment and research, and therefore 
influential hubs, in the new medical-legal network that resulted from the dynamics out-
lined in this paper. Within these sites, clinicians conducted trials of diverse treatments 
that implied different developmental mechanisms for personality disorder, and thereby 
reconstituted ideas about what these conditions were and how they might be acted upon. 
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In effect, psychiatrists and psychologists rebuilt the DSPD Units as laboratories for 
experimenting with all aspects of personality disorder, and thus with understandings of 
personality itself. This exemplifies the potential of local sociotechnical spaces – them-
selves synthesized through heterogeneous assemblages of institutions, discourse and 
practice – to play a central role in the generation of clinical knowledge (in this case, 
knowledge of the nature of personality disorder and how to manage it).23
As we have seen, the mutual constitution of mental health policy and practice has 
profoundly altered understandings of personality disorder. Conditions such as ASPD and 
psychopathy are no longer largely considered obdurate, and are now often framed as 
potentially plastic, mouldable through clinical intervention. This reconceptualization on 
the part of a number of forensic mental health practitioners has not led to a panacea: not 
everyone believes that personality disorder can be treated, and doubts remain about the 
future of DSPD policies and practices, including the decommissioning of Units.24 But a 
significant shift has occurred, as a direct consequence of the reciprocal interaction 
between clinical and policy debates, and the mutual shaping of knowledge and law. And 
for many, psychopaths will never be the same again.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the British Library (Survivor Research Network/
British Sociological Association seminar), London School of Economics (Vital Politics III confer-
ence), University of Groningen and University of Newcastle. I am extremely grateful to the audi-
ences there for their feedback, as I am to the anonymous reviewers and Mike Lynch, for his very 
helpful editorial interventions. Thoughtful commentary was also provided by Peter Bartlett, Kevin 
Howells, Sheila Jasanoff, Alison Kraft, Paul Martin, Sujatha Raman and Geth Rees.
Funding
The research was generously supported by the ESRC and the Wellcome Trust.
Notes
1. For more on the history and sociology of personality disorder, especially ASPD and psychop-
athy, see: Bendelow (2010), Greig (2002), Gurley (2009), Lane (2009), Manning (2000, 2002, 
2006), McCallum (2001), Pickersgill (2009a,b; 2010; 2011a,b; 2012a,b), Pilgrim (2007) and 
Werlinder (1978). As these authors show, framings of personality disorder have mutated over 
the last 150 years or more, and diverge and converge in different ways between nations.
2. Northern Ireland and Scotland have separate legislation.
3. See Moncrieff (2003), Simpson (1976) and Wootton (1980).
4. In particular, debates around the treatability of psychopathy in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands 
and the US have connected with discussions in the UK. Many commentators across North 
America and Western Europe have interrogated similar questions to those raised in Britain.
5. As discussed by Cavadino (1989).
6. See, for example, Stein (1992), Stone (1993) and Yorston (1999).
7. Or ‘Jack Straw Syndrome’, as DSPD became colloquially known among psychiatrists such as 
Peter Tyrer (2001) who were critical of these developments.
8. See for example: Chiswick (1999), Eastman (1999), Freestone (2005), Haddock et al. (2001), 
Mullen (1999) and White (2002).
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 9. The homogenization of the category ‘personality disorder’ has long been common in UK 
mental health, in spite of attempts by formal diagnostic handbooks (or, rather, those who pro-
duce them) to instantiate sub-categories. The Green Paper accepted this, and indeed explicitly 
rejected the definitional schemes of the US DSM-IV. Instead, it sought a unified definition 
of ‘mental disorder’. Accordingly, even though ASPD and psychopathy over-shadowed the 
other forms of personality disorder, so long as an individual was labelled as both severely per-
sonality disordered and dangerous, and their dangerousness was regarded as causally linked 
to their personality disorder, then that person could – in theory – be involuntarily detained. In 
this sense, the government seized on established convention within UK mental health (that is, 
to regularly speak of personality disorder broadly, rather than specific sub-types) in order to 
introduce proposals that were widely regarded as illegitimate.
10. In particular, see Peay (2000) and Szmukler and Holloway (2000).
11. The 70-bed Peaks Unit at Rampton Hospital alone cost £20 million to build (Nottinghamshire 
Healthcare NHS Trust, 2004) and the management of individual DSPD prisoners/patients 
came to cost ‘around £300,000 per annum’ within hospitals, and ‘around £85,000 per place 
per annum’ within prisons (of which ‘about £35,000 p.a.’ was ‘related to treatment costs’) 
(Department of Health/National Offender Management Services Offender Personality 
Disorder Team, 2011: 12).
12. See also Chiswick (2001) and Gunn and Felthous (2000).
13. See also Moncrieff (2003: 8).
14. See, for example, Chiesa et al. (2000), Haddock et al. (2001) and Kendell (2002).
15. See, for example: Bateman and Fonagy (1999), Chiesa and Fonagy (2000) and Mullen (1999).
16. Treatment is discussed by Sushovan and Tyrer (2001) and Triebwasser and Siever (2007).
17. The logics and implementation of these ‘bespoke’ programmes are outlined by Hogue et al. 
(2007) and Livesley (2007).
18. Psychological therapies are also emphasized in UK clinical practice guidelines as treatments 
for both ASPD (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2009) and borderline 
personality disorder (National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2009).
19. For discussion, see Maden (2005) and de Boer et al. (2008).
20. Of course, research continues around personality disorder treatments. It is certainly not my 
aim to suggest that no research was or is taking place on personality disorder outside of the 
National Forensic Mental Health R&D Programme, but rather to underscore that research 
conducted within that programme commanded particular attention.
21. These developments followed further state interest in treatments for personality disorder. The 
DSPD Programme continued and expanded: by 2008, alongside the original four high-secure 
units, four medium secure units and some community services for DSPD were in operation 
(de Boer et al., 2008).
22. As other scholars have shown, psychiatric attitudes and ideology can strongly influence men-
tal health policies, which, in turn, can shape clinical work and opinion (Grob, 2008; Prior, 
1991; Schatzman and Strauss, 1966)
23. Though of course they were not the only sites of research into personality disorder.
24. See, for instance, Department of Health/National Offender Management Services Offender 
Personality Disorder Team (2011).
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